State of Utah v. Brooks Bradshaw : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Brooks Bradshaw : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine F. Soltis; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney
General; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Joan C. Watt; Robert K. Heineman; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Brooks Bradshaw, No. 20040975 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5365
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, Case No. 20040975-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW 
JOAN C. WATT 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS [3039] 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF [4666] 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 26 2005 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, Case No. 20040975-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW 
JOAN C. WATT 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS [3039] 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF [4666] 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
REPLY TO SUBSECTIONS A-C OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: 
NO PERTINENT AUTHORITY SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S DEFINITION 
OF "SCHEME TO DEFRAUD" AS USED IN SUBSECTION (1) OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 1 
REPLY TO SUBSECTIONS D-E OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO CROSS-PETITION; CONSEQUENTLY, HE 
CANNOT ATTACK BRADSHAWS HOLDING THAT SUBSECTIONS (2) & 
(5) OF THE STATUTE ALLOW EACH COMMUNICATION MADE IN A 
SINGLE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD TO BE CHARGED AS A SEPARATE 
OFFENSE, THE DEGREE OF WHICH IS DETERMINED BY THE 
AGGREGATE MONIES OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE OBTAINED IN 
THE SCHEME 16 
CONCLUSION 21 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Statutes and Rules 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Mitchell v. United States, 142 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1944) 14 
Morley Const. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185 (1937) 19 
Owens v. United States, 221 F.2d351 (5th Cir. 1955) 8, 9, 10, 16 
United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498 (11th Cir. 1982) 5 
United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1981) 5 
United States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d7 (1st Cir. 1993) 12 
United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1995) 10 
United States v. Mastelotto, 111 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled on other gds., 
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 135 (1985) 7, 10 
United States v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003) 7 
United States v. Stachulak, 520F.2d931 (7th Cir. 1975) 21 
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576(1981) 14 
Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941) 8 
STATE CASES 
Gottlingv. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002) 12 
Miller v. State, 866 P.2d 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) 6 
Miller v. United States, 2004 UT 96, 104P.3d 1202 19 
People v. First Meridian Planning Corp., 658 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1995) 10 
People v. Kaminsky, 486 N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) 7 
ii 
Richardson v. Matador Steak House, 948 P.2d 347 (Utah 1997) 19, 21 
State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694 (Utah 1981) 11, 12, 15 
State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, 99 P.3d 359 passim 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) 4 
State v. Hansen, 608P.2d 1083 (Mont. 1980) 5 
State v. Ives, 927 P.2d 762 (Ariz. 1996) 6 
State v. Kerekes, 622P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980) 5 
State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, 31 P.3d 547 13 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) 15 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) 19,20,21 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
18U.S.C. § 1341 (West 2004) 6,14 
18U.S.C. § 1343 (West 2004) 6 
18 U.S.C. § 3584 (West 2004) 14 
STATE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (West 2004) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004) 14 
Utah R. App. P. 49 21 
Utah R. Evid. 404 5 
iii 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. : 
Case No. 20040975-SC 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW 
The decision under review is State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298,99 P.3d 359. (A 
copy is contained in Addendum A of the Brief of Petitioner [Br.Pet.].) In addition to the 
facts and arguments presented in the State's opening brief, the State submits the following 
reply to the Brief of Respondent [Br.Resp.]. 
REPLY TO SUBSECTIONS A-C OF DEFENDANTS BRIEF 
NO PERTINENT AUTHORITY SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S 
DEFINITION OF "SCHEME TO DEFRAUD" AS USED IN 
SUBSECTION (1) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
In Bradshaw, the Utah Court of Appeals unanimously held that pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801 (5) (West 2004), the number of chargeable communications fraud offenses 
is determined by the number of separate communications made by a defendant in a single 
scheme to defraud. 2004 UT App 298, fflf 16, 21 & 53 n. 10. The court of appeals also 
unanimously held that pursuant to subsection (2) of the communications fraud statute, the 
degree of each charged offense is determined by the aggregate of the monies obtained or 
sought to be obtained in the overall scheme to defraud. Id. See also Addendum A of this 
brief for copies of cited statutes and rules. 
The panel spilt, however, on what constituted a single scheme to defraud as used in 
subsection (1) of the statute, which reads: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another, or to 
obtain from another money . . . by means of false or fraudulent pretenses 
. . . who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme . . . is guilty of 
[communications fraud] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (Add. A). Compare Brads haw, 2004 UT App 298, ffif 20-
21 (majority opinion), with id. at Yf 50-57 (Thorne J., dissenting). 
In Bradshaw, the majority concluded that a single scheme to defraud could involve 
multiple victims if the victims were defrauded of the same thing, at the same time, in the 
same place, and by the same means.1 2004 UT App 298, f^f 16 & 20 n.7. Applying this 
definition to the facts, the majority concluded that defendant's victims were defrauded of 
different things ($400-$600), at different times (March-June 2000), in different places (cities 
along the Wasatch Front), and by slightly different promises of financing. Id. at % 20. 
Consequently, the majority held that a single scheme to defraud did not exist here and that 
the degree of the individual charged frauds could not be elevated based upon the total 
]The dissent rejected the majority's definition of a single scheme to defraud as 
inconsistent with the term's broader historical meaning and application. See Bradshaw, 
2004 UT App 298, fflf 50-57 (Thorne, J., dissenting). See also Br.Pet. at 11-14 
(discussing scope of single scheme to defraud). 
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amounts obtained. Id. at ffl[ 20-22. See also Br,Pet at 14-15 (discussing why the facts in this 
case establish only one scheme). 
Defendant reads the majority's holding differently. According to defendant, the 
majority held that a single scheme to defraud exists only when there are fraudulent 
"interactions with a single victim where the defendant engaged in a sufficiently distinctive 
scheme with that victim." See Br.Resp. at 18. Defendant asserts that the "majority 
concluded that the phrase 'scheme or artifice to defraud' in subsection (1) refers not only to 
communications made to a single victim, but also requires that the communications be made 
in furtherance of and as a necessary part of a single goal, that the communications be made 
in a similar manner, time frame and place, and that the technique be sufficiently similar and 
distinctive so as to be properly designated as a scheme." Br.Resp. at 22 (citing Bradshaw, 
2004 UT App 298, \ 20). Defendant over-reads Bradshaw. 
The Bradshaw majority did not hold that a single scheme is limited to a single victim. 
See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, f 16 & 20-21 & n.7 (recognizing that subsections (2) and 
(5) jointly apply to a single scheme to defraud, which may include multiple victims, but then 
concluding that here the facts establish multiple schemes). Contrary to defendant's 
assertions, see Br.Resp. at 18-20, the majority expressly recognized that a single scheme may 
include multiple victims. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ^ f 20 & n.7 (citing fraudulent 
investment seminar as an example of a single scheme with multiple victims). The majority 
concluded, however, that in a single scheme, the multiple victims must be defrauded of the 
same thing, at the same time, in the same place, and by the same means. Id. 
3 
Additionally, before the maj ority concluded that multiple schemes existed here, it first 
examined the facts of each charged offense in detail. See id. at 20. If, as defendant claims, 
the majority had held that a single scheme to defraud is limited to a single victim, the 
majority's examination of the facts would have been unnecessary. Instead, applying 
defendant's definition, the number of victims would automatically determine the number of 
schemes to defraud. 
Likewise, defendant erroneously asserts that in Bradshaw, the majority held that each 
communication in a single scheme to defraud must be made "in furtherance of and as a 
necessary part of a single goal" and that the perpetrator must use a "particularly distinctive" 
technique to defraud the victims. See Br.Resp. at 22. Again, the majority made no statement 
concerning the requisite nature of a communication other than to hold that multiple schemes 
existed here because the victims were "deceived at different times, in different places, by 
different stories, and through different methods." See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ^ f 20. 
See also id. at f 20 n.7 (opining that, on the other hand, a single scheme would exist if "each 
victim was deceived at the same time, in the same place, and with the same fraudulent 
representations as the other victims"). 
In addition, no pertinent authority supports defendant's unique interpretation of what 
constitutes a single scheme to defraud. 
In claiming that a single scheme to defraud requires use of a "particularly distinctive" 
technique, defendant cites cases interpreting and applying rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and comparable evidentiary rules. See Br.Resp. at 23-24 (citing State v. 
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Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), and citing United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498 
(11th Cir. 1982), United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1981), and State v. 
Hansen, 608 P.2d 1083 (Mont. 1980)). While these cases discuss what constitutes a 
"common plan, scheme, or manner of operation" for purposes of admitting evidence of bad 
conduct not charged in the information, the decisions do not purport to examine the term 
"scheme" outside the context of the evidentiary rule.2 Consequently, rule 404(b) decisions 
offer no guidance in answering the question here: what constitutes a single scheme to defraud 
for purposes of charging communications fraud. 
Defendant also claims that each communication in a single scheme to defraud must 
"be made as part of and in furtherance of an overall scheme" so that each violation is so 
"linked with the other crimes that the crime charged cannot be proved without proving the 
other crimes." See Br.Resp. at 23-24 (emphasis in original). Again, the cases cited by 
defendant do not support his definition of a single scheme to defraud. For example, in State 
v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980), this Court did not address what constituted a single 
scheme to defraud. Instead, it held only that conversations and evidence in connection with 
a deceptive scheme in Arizona were admissible in a Utah theft by deception prosecution 
because they evidenced an early planning step in the Utah scheme and established Kerekes's 
"intent and knowledge regarding the illegal nature of the [Utah] operation." See id. at 1165. 
2Moreover, though the cited decisions use the term "scheme," the cited evidentiary 
rules do not contain the term. See, e.g., Utah R. Evid. 404(b) ("[e]vidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . may [] be admissible . . . [to prove] motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident") 
(AddA). 
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Similarly, Miller v. State, 866 P.2d 130 , 133-34 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994), did not address 
what constituted a single scheme to defraud, but only held that evidence of failed drug-
trafficking was admissible in a robbery prosecution pursuant to rule 404(b) because both 
crimes were "aimed at a common goal—to bankroll a larger drug enterprise—[so as to give] 
the disputed evidence legitimate relevance as a common scheme or plan." In State v. Ives, 
927 P.2d 762,766-791 (Ariz. 1996), the Arizona Supreme Court did not address "scheme to 
defraud," but reversed four child molestation convictions because the charges, involving 
different victims molested at different times over a seven-to-eight year period, were 
improperly joined and the multiple incidents were not otherwise admissible pursuant to rule 
404(b). 
Though none of the cases cited by defendant address what constitutes a single scheme 
to defraud for purposes of charging communications fraud, this question has been fully 
answered by other courts for sixty years. 
Under the federal statutory scheme, communications fraud is designated as "frauds 
and swindles by use of the mail," 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (West 2004), or "fraud by wire, radio, 
or television," 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (West 2004), commonly referred to as mail and wire fraud, 
respectively. See Add. A. When Utah enacted its state communications fraud statute, section 
76-10-1801, it chose these federal statutes as its model: "The language of [Utah's 
communications fraud statute] is based on the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes [sic] 
. . . [which] statutes have withstood the test of almost 100 years of experience." See 
Comments of Brent Ward, United States Attorney for the District of Utah, Floor Debate, 46th 
6 
Leg. Gen. Sess. (February 27, 1985) (Senate Recording No. 129), attached in Addendum F 
of the Brief of Respondent. Though defendant acknowledges the federal model for the state 
statute, see Br.Resp. at 16-17, he ignores the years of interpretative case law referenced. 
That jurisprudence establishes that for purposes of charging mail and/or wire fraud, 
a single "'scheme to defraud' has a wider meaning than an individual act of fraud." See 
United States v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). A single 
scheme to defraud is not limited to a single victim, but is "established by the similarity of 
fraudulent practices used in regard to numerous victims." See People v. Kaminsky, 486 
N.Y.S. 2d 814, 820 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (citing federal case law). Consequently, a single 
scheme "exists by virtue of the planned pattern of conduct . . . and not according to the 
number of persons actually defrauded." Id. 
Most significantly for present purposes, the details of the separate transactions 
alleged to comprise parts of the scheme do not have to be identical in every 
respect, as long as the fact finder is satisfied that there are, among the 
transactions, common elements by which each transaction may be identified 
as having been undertaken pursuant to an overall fraudulent design." 
Id. (citing Owens v. United States, 221 F.2d 351, 354-55 (5th Cir. 1955), together with 
similar state cases).3 
3The quotation's reference to "the fact-finder" is because "[i]n a mail or wire fraud 
case in which a defendant contends that a variance has occurred between the single 
scheme charged in each count of the indictment and the proof at trial, the jury must be 
instructed that each of the jurors must find the defendant guilty of participation in the 
same scheme to defraud and that the scheme to defraud in which the defendant is found to 
have participated is the same scheme as the overall fraudulent scheme alleged in the 
indictment." United States v. Mastelotto, 111 F.2d 1238, 1247 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled 
on other gds., United States v. Miller, All U.S. 130, 135-36 (1985) (emphasis in 
original). 
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It is well-established that in communications fraud, a single scheme to defraud may 
involve "the defrauding of different people over an extended period of time, using different 
means and representations.55 See Owens, 221 F.2d at 354. See also additional cases cited 
in Br.Pet. at 12-14 . Indeed, the breadth of single scheme is limited only by "the ingenuity 
of the schemer.55 Weiss v. United States, 122F.2d675,681 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 314U.S. 
687 (1941) (noting that what constitutes a fraudulent scheme needs "no definition55 as the 
concept is as "old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity55). 
An examination of the facts of several cases, cited for their legal conclusions in 
Br.Pet. at 12-14, demonstrates the variations permissible in a single scheme to defraud. 
As far back as 1941, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether mail frauds 
carried out in different ways constituted a single scheme to defraud. In Weiss, 122 F.2d at 
679, the defendant (an architect) conspired with others to fraudulently obtain additional 
payments in connection with a state building contract by padding the bid on some buildings, 
presenting fraudulent documents for payment on others, falsifying architect's certificates for 
subcontractors5 work and materials, and concealing the submitted false documentation from 
members of his architectural firm. The Fifth Circuit Court concluded that even though the 
"details55 changed and a "variety of means55 were employed, the multiple mail fraud charges 
were all part of a single scheme "to obtain money by fraud in connection with the building 
contract.55 Id. at 680-81. 
Fifteen years later, in 1955, the Fifth Circuit again concluded that multiple charges 
of mail fraud involving multiple victims were part of a single scheme to defraud. See Owens, 
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221 F.2d at 354. In Owens, the federal appellate court was not troubled that the multiple 
victims were defrauded over a two-year period of different amounts ranging from $900 to 
$250,000 at different locations and by different means because the same critical fact applied 
to all the frauds: in each case, Owens represented that he "was a prosperous and successful 
business man with great financial power and resources." Id. at354-55. Additionally, Owens 
evidenced the same intent in committing each fraud: "to defraud anyone and everyone who 
could be tricked . . . into parting with his money or property in return for some promise of 
benefit in connection with Owens5 ventures." Id. (viewing these as most prominent common 
elements, but discussing others). The federal court noted that Owens repeatedly used some 
variation of his fraudulent pitch in each fraud, though the details changed to "suit each 
victim's appetite and credulity." Id. at 355. The fact that the details changed was of little 
consequence, however, given, the "general similarity of technique" and the commonality of 
Owens' role. Id. According to the Fifth Circuit, a similar, though not identical, pattern is 
the hallmark of a single scheme to defraud: 
It is well known that many swindlers have a characteristic modus operandi and 
that there are terminological, if not always juristic, distinctions among there 
[sic] techniques. Some operate simply by giving worthless checks; others are 
check "kiters"; still others are short change artists. Some specialize in 
impersonation; others in selling worthless securities and oil leases; some in the 
old racetrack swindle. To mention only by their unsavory names some other 
recurring devices used by confidence men, there are the Spanish prisoner, the 
bankroll on the sidewalk, the badger game and marked cards and loaded dice. 
The continuous and habitual use of any of these techniques even over a long 
period on numerous victims in many different places, in our opinion would 
normally constitute a single fraudulent scheme, the necessary unity deriving 
from the fact that the technique planned and used in each transaction is of the 
same general type. This, of course, is not to say that two or more of these 
general types of fraudulent conduct may not be combined in a single scheme. 
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Id. at 355. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Owens-Weiss definition in 
Mastelotto, 111 F.2d at 1245. The Ninth Circuit concluded that two charges of mail fraud 
and eight charges of wire fraud were not duplicitous and could be charged as a single scheme 
to defraud. Id. at 1241 & 1247. The alleged scheme involved "numerous fraudulent 
transactions conducted over a ten-year period in Utah, Nevada, and California by and 
through three corporations engaged in the processing and sale of oil products." Id. at 1241. 
Two "distinct" means were used: (1) in the "mislabeling" transactions, oil containers were 
mislabeled and sold for more than their actual worth; and (2) in the "corporate sale" 
transactions, purchasers of the corporations' assets were not told of the fraudulent profits 
from the "mislabeling" transactions. Id. at 1241-42. The court held that both types of 
transactions were part of the same scheme to defraud "the purchasers of both oil and assets," 
but ultimately reversed because the jury was not properly instructed. Id. at 1245-46 & 1249-
50. Accord People v. First Meridian Planning Corp., 658 N.E.2d 1017, 1021-22 (N.Y. 
1995) (citing Owens, 221 F.2d 351, and Mastelotto, 111 F.2d 1238, and concluding that 
multiple frauds involving 800 victims defrauded in different ways by First Meridian were 
included within a single scheme to defraud). 
In United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected the very argument defendant now makes: "that the 'scheme or 
artifice to defraud' is limited to each individual defrauded client." See Br.Resp. at 18 & 22 
(arguing that a single scheme to defraud is limited to a single victim). The federal appellate 
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court found no reason or authority to support Massey's single-scheme/single-victim 
proposition and concluded that even though Massey's multiple victims were defrauded at 
different times, in different places, of different amounts, and by slightly different means, the 
facts established one massive fraudulent loan scheme. Id. at 1564-65. 
Despite the clear federal origins of Utah's communications fraud statute and the 
consistency of the interpretation of those federal statutes, defendant argues that his definition 
of a single scheme to defraud should be applied because it better comports with the single 
larceny rule.4 See Br. Resp. at 26. This is incorrect. 
The single larceny rule is a common law rule which aids charging decisions in theft 
prosecutions. In theft, the punishable act is the "taking" of property. See State v. Barker, 
624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981). The single larceny rule focuses on this component and 
guides the determination of when multiple charges should be prosecuted based on the value 
of each separate item taken or when a single elevated charge should be prosecuted based on 
aggregate value of all items taken. See id. at 695-96. See also Br.Pet. at 19-20 (discussing 
the basis and limitations of the single larceny rule). 
In contrast, the punishable act in communications fraud is the communication itself; 
no actual taking need occur. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 {Add. A). Accord United 
4Defendant makes two arguments in connection with the single larceny rule. First, 
he argues that the larceny rule is consistent with his definition of single scheme to defraud 
as used in subsection (1) and second, that the larceny rule prevents subsections (2) and (5) 
from being jointly applied. See Br.Resp. at 26 & 30-35. To the extent that defendant's 
single larceny argument applies to subsection (1), it is addressed. But the argument is not 
properly before this Court in connection with subsections (2) and (5) and, therefore, the 
State does not address that portion of the argument. See discussion, infra at 16-21. 
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States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing that mail and wire fraud are 
construed differently than other types of fraud, because the prohibited act in mail and wire 
fraud is the communication and not the taking). Consequently, the single larceny rule does 
not control. See Br.Pet. at 19-20. 
Moreover, the single larceny rule pre-existed the enactment of Utah's communications 
fraud statute. Compare Br.Resp., Add. F (1985 enactment date), with Barker, 624 P.2d at 
695-96 (in 1981 applying single larceny rule to a Utah theft prosecution). Yet, not only did 
the Utah Legislature not reference the larceny rule in discussing the proposed 
communications fraud statute, but one legislator commented that current theft provisions 
were inadequate to combat fraud because theft required a taking with an intent to 
permanently deprive the property owner. See Comments of Representative McCackney, 
Floor Debate, 46th Gen. Session (February 11, 1985) (House Recording No. 4), attached in 
Br.Resp., Add. F. The Utah Legislature adopted the communications fraud statute with the 
understanding that fraud was different than theft. See Br.Resp., Add. F (floor debates). 
Consequently, common law theft concepts offer no help in interpreting the statute. See 
Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, f 7 ,61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002) (recognizing that common 
law doctrines "cannot be authority in opposition" to Utah's legislative enactments) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, defendant asserts that the State is advocating an "extreme" interpretation of 
subsection (1) which would impermissibility join separate multiple schemes to defraud in a 
12 
single prosecution and, thereby, produce an unduly "harsh" result. SeeBr.Resp. at 18 & 27. 
The assertion fails. 
The State has never claimed that "scheme to defraud" as used in subsection (1) 
includes multiple independent schemes to defraud. The State only argues that, consistent 
with the historical usage of the term "scheme to defraud," a single scheme to defraud may 
include multiple victims defrauded of different things, at different times, at different places, 
and by slightly different means. See Br.Pet. at 11-16. See also Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 
298, f 16 n.5 (majority) & ^  55 (dissent). 
Moreover, no harsh result occurred here where, after defendant entered pleas to 
reduced charges, he received only concurrent terms of zero-to-five years for defrauding 
eleven persons. See Br.Pet. at 16-17 & n.4 (discussing majority's error in limiting "single 
scheme to defraud" to avoid the "repugnant" result of an alleged 165-year prison term for a 
$5,400 fraud). See also State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 28,31 P.3d 547 (recognizing that 
a defendant does not have standing to attack the harshness of a sentence he did not receive). 
In any case, the state communications fraud statute punishes each violation by at most 
one-to-fifteen years imprisonment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1 )(a)-(e) (classifying 
communications fraud as at most a second degree felony) {Add. A). In contrast, the federal 
mail and wire fraud statues punish each violation by up to twenty-years imprisonment, or if 
5As discussed in footnote 4, supra, defendant makes this argument in connection 
with subsection (1), but also expands it to include subsections (2) and (5). See Br.Resp. at 
29-30 & n.2. Only the subsection (1) argument is properly before this Court. See 
discussion, infra at 16-21. The State does not respond to defendant's argument as applied 
to subsections (2) & (5). 
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the violation involves a financial institution, by up to thirty-years imprisonment and a fine 
of $1,000,000. See 18U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 (Add. A). See also Mitchell v. UnitedStates, 
142 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1944) (recognizing that once a scheme to defraud is devised, 
each use of the mail constitutes a separate violation). Consequently, if defendant had used 
the mail or a telephone to commit these same crimes and had been prosecuted federally, he 
would have faced the potential of 220 years imprisonment (11 x 20 years).6 
Finally, defendant claims that the "rule of lenity" compels the narrowest interpretation 
of scheme to defraud as used in subsection (l).7 See Br.Resp. at 17 & 26. Again, the rule 
of lenity is inapplicable here. 
As briefly noted in Br.Pet. at 18 n.4, proper statutory construction does not begin with 
lenity towards the accused. Instead, the concept of lenity arises only at the end of the 
statutory construction process, "as an aid for resolving ambiguity" if that process results in 
two equally applicable interpretations of a statute. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 
576, 586 n. 10 (1981) (recognizing that the rule of lenity is inapplicable where no statutory 
ambiguity remains after traditional statutory construction rules are followed). In Utah, lenity 
has been applied only when "there is doubt or uncertainty" as to which of two punishments 
6Moreover, in Utah, a defendant sentenced to multiple consecutive felony terms 
serves no more than 30 years. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004) (Add. A). 
See Br.Pet. at 16 n.4. The federal sentencing scheme does not appear to contain a 
comparable limitation and treats multiple consecutive terms as "a single, aggregate term 
of imprisonment." See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) & (c) (West 2004) (Add. A). 
7As explained in footnores 4 & 5, supra, the State only addresses this argument in 
the context of subsection (1). But to the extent the argument is expanded to include 
interpretation of subsections (2) and (5), see Br.Resp. at 31-35, the State does not 
respond. See discussion, infra at 16-21. 
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is applicable to a crime. State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969). See also State 
v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694,696 (Utah 1981) (without referencing the rule of lenity, recognizing 
the presumption that "doubts in the enforcement of the penal code" are resolved "against the 
imposition of a harsher punishment"). 
Here, "scheme to defraud" is not ambiguous as used in subsection (l).8 Federal 
jurisprudence—the undisputed model for the state communications fraud statute—has for 
decades recognized that communications frauds involving multiple victims defrauded at 
different times, in different places, of different things, and by slightly different means may 
be part of a single scheme to defraud. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, \\ 50-57 (Thorne, 
J., dissenting and advocating federal interpretation of scheme to defraud). See also Br.Pet. 
at 12-14. In contrast, the majority cited no authority for its requirement that the multiple 
victims in a single scheme must be defrauded at the same time, in the same place, of the same 
thing, and by identical means. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, f 20. Nor does any 
pertinent authority support defendant's even narrower definition that a single scheme is 
limited to a single victim. See discussion, supra. 
In sum, this Court should clarify that a single scheme to defraud may involve the 
"defrauding of different people over an extended period of time, using different means and 
representations," when the evidence establishes: (1) the "continuous and habitual use" of the 
Contrary to defendant's implication, see Br.Resp. at 14, the trial prosecutor did 
not state that scheme to defraud as used in subsection (1) was ambiguous, but only 
candidly acknowledged that "we've had [district] courts go both ways" in applying the 
charging provisions in subsections (2) and (5) of the statute (R155: 8-9). 
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same general, but not necessarily identical, fraudulent technique; and (2) the common, but 
again not necessarily identical, role played by the defendant in the individual transactions. 
See Owens, 221 F.2d at 354-55. Applying that definition to this case, the facts establish a 
single scheme to defraud multiple victims and Brads haw's conclusion to the contrary should 
be reversed. See Br.Pet. at 14-16 (discussing facts of this case). 
REPLY TO SUBSECTIONS D-E OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO CROSS-PETITION; CONSEQUENTLY HE 
CANNOT ATTACKBRADSHA W'S HOLDING THAT SUBSECTIONS 
(2) & (5) OF THE STATUTE ALLOW EACH COMMUNICATION 
MADE IN A SINGLE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD TO BE CHARGED AS 
A SEPARATE OFFENSE, THE DEGREE OF WHICH IS 
DETERMINED BY THE AGGREGATE MONIES OBTAINED OR 
SOUGHT TO BE OBTAINED IN THE SCHEME 
In the trial court and on appeal, defendant argued that subsections (2) and (5) of 
section 76-10-1801 must be read in the alternative or declared unconstitutional. According 
to defendant, the two subsections constitutionally only permitted the State to charge multiple 
individual violations or one aggregated violation. See Br.Resp. at 31. Additionally, in his 
trial memorandum, defendant also asserted that here he could only be prosecuted for multiple 
misdemeanor violations based on his one-scheme/one-victim theory (R. 88). But during the 
subsequent hearing on his motion to reduce and again on appeal, defendant admitted that the 
prosecutor could elect to alternatively charge him with one second-degree felony based on 
the aggregate value of the eleven frauds (R155: 5-6, 10-11). See also Brief of Appellant at 
24-25; Reply Brief of Appellant at 9. 
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The court of appeals unanimously rejected defendant's argument that subsections (2) 
and (5) must be read in the alternative. The court recognized no constitutional impediment 
to applying the two subsections together as long as the multiple violations were part of the 
same scheme to defraud. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ffi[ 16,21 & 53 n. 10. The panel 
unanimously concluded that pursuant to subsections (2) and (5), each communication made 
in a single scheme to defraud was a separate communications fraud violation, the degree of 
which was determined by the aggregate monies obtained or sought to be obtained in the 
overall scheme. See id. As explained in the majority opinion: 
[T]he Legislature's obvious policy to "get tough" on communications fraud is 
aptly served under the interpretation of section 76-10-1801 embraced here. As 
previously noted, the statute allows the State to treat each communication in 
furtherance of a scheme or artifice as a separate offense and may, in 
appropriate cases, allow the State to aggregate money taken from each 
individual victim of a single, coherent scheme for purposes of making the 
crimes second degree felonies—stern enforcement by any standard. Absent 
explicit direction from the Legislature, however, we will not read the statute 
as additionally allowing the State to attribute the losses from each victim of 
multiple schemes to all other victims. 
Id. at | 21. The dissent agreed with this interpretation of subsections (2) and (5), but 
disputed the majority's interpretation of subsection (1): 
This case, regardless of the outcome, involves nothing more than standard 
statutory interpretation. [Citation and quotation omitted.] The language of the 
communications fraud statute is not ambiguous. In fact, because both the 
majority opinion and the dissent ultimately rest their analyses on whether 
Bradshaw's conduct followed a common method or technique, it would seem 
that we agree on the meaning of Utah Code section 76-10-[1801]. Our 
disagreement rests instead in the application of the statute and not in its 
meaning. 
Id. at T| 53 n.10 (Thome, J., dissenting). 
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In seeking certiorari review, the State acknowledged the unanimous holding of the 
court of appeals and did not challenge it. See State's Petition for Certiorari Review at 1 & 
4-5. Defendant likewise acknowledged the court of appeals5 unanimous interpretation of 
subsections (2) and (5) and did not seek review of that ruling. See Defendant's Brief in 
Opposition to Certiorari Review at 6. Instead, defendant asserted that certiorari review 
should not be granted because the State protested only the application of the majority's 
interpretation of subsection (1) to the facts. See id. at 10-11. 
Nevertheless, in his responsive brief, defendant now claims that combing subsections 
(2) & (5) of the communications fraud statute is unconstitutional. Defendant claims that the 
degree of individual charged offenses cannot be based on the aggregate value of the overall 
scheme "even if all counts are part of the same scheme" Br.Resp. at 35 & 32 (emphasis 
added). Defendant claims that allowing the degree of individual offenses to be aggregated 
violates due process and results in double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. See 
Br.Resp. at 26-35. In essence, defendant seeks a declaration that the communications fraud 
statute is unconstitutional as written and as interpreted in Bradshaw. He also seeks to limit 
the State's existing enforcement rights under Bradshaw. 
Consequently, defendant was required to file a cross-petition. Because he failed to 
seek certiorari review, defendant's claims concerning subsections (2) and (5) should not be 
considered by this Court. See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355-56 (Utah 1996). 
"A ruling may be based on various grounds. If a lower court reaches a correct ruling 
on a ground that is invalid, a reviewing court may nevertheless sustain the ruling on the basis 
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of a valid ground." Richardson v. Matador Steak House, 948 P.2d 347, 350 (Utah 1997) 
(citing South, 924 P.2d at 357). But "there is a critical distinction between different grounds 
for a ruling and different claims for relief." Id. 
Different claims for relief invoke different theories of recovery, are subject to 
differing limitations and defenses, and may give rise to different species of 
relief This is so notwithstanding the fact that multiple claims for relief may 
arise out of the same operative facts and may result in similar recoveries. 
Because differing claims may produce different damage awards, the effect of 
allowing a party to try to revive a claim for relief is to modify the [] court's 
judgment or decision on the merits, and that is not permitted in a responsive 
brief. 
Id. at 350 n.3 (citingSouth, 924 P.2d at 355 (citinglangnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-89 
(1931))). Accord Miller v. United States, 2004 UT 96, % 27, 104 P.3d 1202 (Durrant, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (noting sound policy and efficiency reasons for only considering 
the question presented on certiorari review). 
When only one party seeks review, "the other is bound by the decree in the court 
below, and he cannot assign error . . . nor can he be heard if the proceedings . . . are correct, 
except in support of the decree from which the appeal of the other party is taken." See 
Morley Const Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185,191-92 (1937) (citingLangnes and 
other Supreme Court cases for the general proposition; specific citation and quotation marks 
omitted). Consequently, if a respondent wishes to "attack a judgment of a lower court for 
the purpose of enlarging [his] own rights or lessening the rights of [his] opponent," the 
respondent must cross-petition for certiorari review. South, 924 P.2d at 356 (explaining and 
adopting Langnes doctrine) (other citation omitted). A respondent cannot use his opponent' s 
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petition "as a vehicle to gain a greater benefit than that granted below." Id. Yet, this is what 
defendant is attempting here. 
As Bradshaw stands, section 76-10-1801 has no constitutional infirmities. The State 
has full enforcement rights to charge multiple communications frauds charges, each based 
on the aggregate sums sought in a scheme, as long as each of the victims was defrauded in 
the same scheme as defined by the majority. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, fflf 20=-21. 
According to the Bradshaw majority, the State would be entitled to charge multiple elevated 
communications frauds if, for example, the multiple victims were defrauded in the same 
investment seminar. 2004 UT App 298, \ 20 n.7. 
Defendant seeks more. He claims that even when a single scheme exists, the State is 
precluded from elevating the degree of an individual communications fraud. See Br.Resp. 
at 32-35. Defendant claims that when multiple victims are defrauded in a single scheme, 
each victim must be separately charged based only on the sum obtained or sought to be 
obtained from that victim. See id. at 31-32 & 35. Moreover, defendant claims that even 
when a single victim is defrauded multiple times, the multiple frauds may only be combined 
into one aggravated charge. Cf. id. In sum, defendant contends that there is no constitutional 
interpretation which would permit subsection (2) to be read in conjunction with subsection 
(5) as allowed by Bradshaw. 
Moreover, the interpretation and constitutionality of subsections (2) and (5) are not 
dependent or subsumed within the definition of single scheme to defraud as used in 
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subsection (1). See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) (directing that on certiorari review, "[o]nly the 
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered). 
Because defendant's arguments attack the unanimous holding of the court of appeals 
and seek to curtail the rights of the State, this Court should refuse to consider their merits in 
the absence of a proper cross-petition. Accord Richards, 948 P.2d at 350; South, 924 P.2d 
at 355-56. See also United States v. Stachulak, 520 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that a constitutional challenge to a statute could not be raised by a respondent in the absence 
of a proper cross-petition). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments and facts contained in the State's opening and reply briefs, 
the Court should reverse Part II of the Bradshaw opinion, affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to reduce the degree or number of communications fraud, and remand 
the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted th is^^^day of September, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
UMathJ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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PART 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON SENTENCES 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 1 . Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)03). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws 
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff. 





PART 18. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 8 0 1 . Communications fraud—Elements—Penalties 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Laws 1985, c. 157, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 79, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 24, eff. May 1, 
1995. 
West's 
Utah Court Rules 
Annotated 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a 
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused 
and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of 
the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution 
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the 
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good 
cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 





§ 1341. Frauds and swindles 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money 
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, 
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or 
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or 
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or 
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to 
be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose 
of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so 
to do, places in any post office or authorized deposito-
ry for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be 
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or 
under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986. 
(Added Pub.L. 93-583, § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1916, and 
amended Pub.L. 94-525, § 1, Oct. 17, 1976, 90 Stat. 2478; 
Pub.L. 96-90, § 1, Oct. 23, 1979, 93 Stat. 698; Pub.L. 
100-625, §§ 2(a), (b), 3(a)(1), (3), Nov. 7,1988, 102 Stat. 3205, 
3206.) 
§ 1343. Fraud by wire, radio, or television 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money 
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to 
be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any 
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the 
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both. If the violation affects a financial 
institution, such person shall be fined not more than 
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or 
both. 
(Added July 16, 1952, c. 879, § 18(a), 66 Stat. 722, and 
amended July 11, 1956, c. 561, 70 Stat. 523; Aug. 9, 1989, 
Pub.L. 101-73, Title IX, § 961(j), 103 Stat. 500; Nov. 29, 
1990, Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXV, § 2504®, 104 Stat. 4861; 
Sept. 13, 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, Title XXXIII, 
§ 330016(1)(H), 108 Stat. 2147; July 30, 2002, Pub.L. 
107-204, Title IX, § 903(b), 116 Stat. 805.) 
§ 3584. Multiple sentences of imprisonment 
(a) Imposition of concurrent or consecutive 
terms.—If multiple terms of imprisonment are im-
posed on a defendant at the same time, or if a term of 
imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is al-
ready subject to an undischarged term of imprison-
ment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutive-
ly, except that the terms may not run consecutively 
for an attempt and for another offense that was the 
sole objective of the attempt. Multiple terms of im-
prisonment imposed at the same time run concurrent-
ly unless the court orders or the statute mandates 
that the terms are to run consecutively. Multiple 
terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run 
consecutively unless the court orders that the terms 
are to run concurrently. 
(b) Factors to be considered in imposing concur-
rent or consecutive terms.—The court, in determin-
ing whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to 
run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to 
each offense for which a term of imprisonment is 
being imposed, the factors set forth in section 3553(a). 
(c) Treatment of multiple sentence as an aggre-
gate.—Multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run 
consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for ad-
ministrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of 
imprisonment. 
(Added Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 
Stat 2000.) 
